The best time to sell is where three curves overlap. Most owners sell off one of them.

What are the three curves?

The first is the company's own trajectory, and it is the only one the owner controls. It is not simply growth. It is the combination of growth and de-risking: revenue rising while the reasons a buyer might discount it are falling away. A business growing 20% with one customer at 45% of revenue and a founder holding every relationship is on a rising curve and a falling one at the same time.

The second is the sector multiple, which is a fact about other people's transactions. Capital rotates between sectors faster than most owners track, and the rotation is currently the sharpest in a decade. A business can improve every year and still be worth less, because the pool of buyers who want that category has thinned.

The third is the financing window, which sets what a buyer can borrow and therefore what they can pay. It is the curve owners think about least and the one that most directly converts into price at this size.

The optimum is the overlap. The mistake is not that owners choose the wrong curve. It is that they treat the first as the only one, and read the other two as noise or as something an advisor will handle.

What does selling off trajectory alone cost?

The published estimates are large enough that the number should be treated as directional rather than precise. Exit planning initiated three to five years before the target date is reported to increase the sale price by 20% to 50% against an unprepared sale, with customer base diversification named explicitly as a prerequisite for that premium (Acquisition Stars, exit planning analysis, April 2026).

That source is an exit-planning publication rather than an audited transaction series, and no regulator or professional body publishes a measured planned-versus-forced price differential. What can be said with more confidence is the direction and the mechanism, both of which are corroborated. Sellers who run thorough sell-side diligence before launch are reported to close 20% to 40% faster and at higher valuations (Govern365, May 2026), and the transactions that closed in the current market shared well-prepared financial packages that minimized re-trading risk (Capstone Partners, Capital Markets Update, 4 June 2026).

The cost of forced timing is easier to see from the other direction. A sale triggered by illness, partnership breakdown, a lost customer or exhaustion arrives with no ability to wait for the other two curves, no time to build evidence, and a buyer who can usually tell. Every one of those is a real reason to sell. None of them is a reason the market pays more.

How do you read the two curves you do not control?

From published transactions, not from sentiment. The sector curve is read from where committed capital is going: the sector's share of sponsor deal value, and its share of new loan issuance, both of which are published quarterly and both of which move further and faster than most owners track. The financing curve is read from two numbers, the leverage multiple lenders are funding at the company's size and the direction of policy rates, because together they set what a buyer can borrow and therefore what a buyer can pay.

The practical reading for timing is narrow. If the sector curve is rising underneath the business, an owner has an argument for accelerating even if the company curve has not peaked. If it is falling, the company curve has to do all the work, and waiting for the sector to recover is only a plan if there is published evidence that it will. The same discipline applies to financing: a tightening window argues for moving while capacity holds, and a loosening one is only worth waiting for once it is in print rather than in forecasts.

This piece deliberately carries no current readings, because they date within a quarter. We publish them separately, under the question owners ask, is now a good time to sell, with a source and date on each condition, and that companion piece is rewritten every quarter. The full sector rotation is also set out on its own, under the heading that energy took a quarter of US private equity deal value while software lost two thirds. Both are linked below.

What if the curves never line up?

They frequently do not, and planning on a perfect overlap is a way of never selling. The workable version is to get the company curve into a state where any reasonable alignment of the other two is enough, and then to be able to move inside a few months when it happens.

That has a defined lead time. Exit preparation is now advised to begin twelve to twenty-four months before a sale, and assets not already in preparation by mid-2026 are structurally 2027 and 2028 transactions (EY, Global Private Equity Exit Readiness Study 2026, published 28 July 2026). The financial record takes longer still: the current standard is at least thirty-six months of clean, normalized monthly financials (Capstone Partners, 4 June 2026). An owner who decides to sell and starts preparing on the same day has already chosen a date two to three years out, whether or not they know it.

The de-risking work has the longest lead time of all, because it has to appear in a trailing period before a buyer will credit it. Customer concentration, management depth and revenue contracted rather than renewed annually all take years to move in the numbers, which is a separate subject we have written on in terms of how far ahead a diversification program has to start.

So the answer to when is usually not a date in the market. It is the earliest date by which the business could be ready, and the calculation of that number is the one worth doing first.